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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to studying the existing national and international criteria 
and methodologies related to the banking capitals measurement. We examine the minimum 
requirements for banking capital and the actual status of Romanian banks in terms of solvency 
ratio. The paper analyzes the risk-based capital ratios through a case study at the level of a banking 
society from Romania. We quantify the capital charges by reference to the regulatory capital 
expressed as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets and by reference to the Tier 1 capital 
expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Our research reveals that the level of 
capitalization is relevant for the ability of banks to absorb the losses generated by either exogenous 
shocks induced by the domestic and international macroeconomic environment, or by the 
inappropriate management of the endogenous risks associated with banking activity.  
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1. Theoretical background.  
 
The present stage of knowledge in the area related to the subject shows that capital 
adequacy is a process of dimensioning of the banking societies capital imposed by legislative 
requirements. Capital adequacy implies the conventional assessment of the minimal level of capital, 
according to certain parameters, which reflect the dimension of banking activity and of related risks, 
capable to provide a correlation between the supposed obtained benefits and potential loss caused 
by a certain risk level. In order to stop the tendencies of credit societies to maximize their profits by 
using intensively their own funds, banking supervising authorities impose the maintaining of a 
certain balance between the funds owned by these societies and the level of the borrowed capital, 
establishing restrictions concerning the excessive using of their own resources. In a banking society, 
the main role of the capital, besides the transfer of the property, is to act like a pad in order to 
amortize the unexpected loss, to protect the deponents and to assure the confidence of the investors 
and rating agents.  
Specialized literature treats the capital adequacy issue using the following defining 
concepts: regulatory capital and economic capital. Regulatory capital refers to minimal capital 
requirements which banks must own according to the regulations made by national supervision 
authorities. The establishment of capital requirements has the main objective to assure the stability 
and the viability of national banking system. Economic capital has to act like a pad of protection 
against all the risks that may put in danger the solvency of the bank. Economic capital is a recent 
notion used in the financial theory and financial practice which is defined as being the level of 
capital required for the amortization of normal loss (beyond those expected) generated by the 
clients’ inobservance of paying their obligations which had been established by the means of a 
previous contract. More elevated the level of the capital of a bank is, smaller will be the probability 
that the bank enters in total payment impossibility, or to suffer a judicial reorganization or bankrupt. 
In consequence, the foundation on real bases of the volume of banking capitalization has an 
important role because the financial health of that certain institution depends on it.    389
The general approach of capital adequacy process shows that its incipient stages are 
directly linked to the activity of Basel Committee- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In 
1988, in the context of international banking field development, the Committee had decided to 
introduce a system of capital measurement known as the Basel Agreement I [International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, Basel, 1988]. The agreement imposed 
a minimal standard of capital for banks, according to which the basic capital of a bank must be 
maintained at an 8% level from banks exposure. The regulation was establishing a minimal report 
of 8%, calculated as a ratio between the funds owned and level-headed actives depending on risks. 
To different actives categories it was reserved certain risk level between 0 and 100%. Since 1988, 
this structure was progressively introduced in the member states of European Union and in many 
other countries, which had recognized the importance of banking capital regulation.  
In Romania, starting from 1990, there was established regulations regarding the banking 
solvency [National Romanian Bank’s Regulation no.4, regarding banking solvency, 1994]. Since 
2003, the national legislation related with the field of banking solvency was improved and 
Romanian active banking societies, in their quality of credit institutions, permanently had to 
maintain the solvency indicatory up to a level of 12% [National Romanian Bank’s Regulation no. 
12, regarding the supervision of the solvency and of the exposure of large credit institutions, 2003]. 
The solvency indicatory shows the funds owned, considered to be a part of the entire amount of 
actives, and also a part made of elements exterior to balance sheet, payments to agents, modified 
and adjusted according to risks. The minimal limit of solvency indicatory established in our country 
was higher than that of 8% imposed by Basel Agreement I, thus showing a more cautious attitude of 
regulation authority related to the field- National Bank of Romania.  
In June 1999, the Basel Committee proposed a revision of the capital adequacy structure, 
imposed by the development of risk administration methods and by the fixity of the condition of 
Basel Agreement I. After intensive interactions with banks, industrial groups and national 
supervision authorities, in November 2005, was finalized and signed Basel Capital Agreement II 
[International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework – 
Comprehensive Version, Basel, 2006]. Basel Agreement II is made up of three pillars that support 
one another: Pillar 1 regulates the minimum capital requirements necessary for covering specific 
risks of banking: credit risk, market risk and operational risk; Pillar 2 is represented by the process 
of prudential supervision, which imposes the national supervision authorities to make sure that 
banks dispose of healthy internal procedure to evaluate their own risks; Pillar 3 intends to 
consolidate market discipline by increasing the financial transparency of banks. 
In Romania, in the context of preliminary preparations of Romanian banking system for 
applying the conditions of Basel II Agreement, at the end of 2006, it was adopted a set of normative 
acts in the field of banking capital adequacy. In this way, the concept of capital adequacy is also 
present in our country, but in the first years of development of the new Romanian banking system, 
the specific legislation was making references only to capital requirements (art. 40-43 from banking 
Law no. 58/1998) and lately in the context of the implementation of Basel Agreement II, the 
concept of capital adequacy was also used by national regulations. The main settlements regarding 
the banking capital adequacy are the following: 
- Government Emergency Ordinance No. 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital 
adequacy, as subsequently amended and supplemented by Law No. 227/2007 settles the general 
frame of risk management in banks.  
- Regulation No. 18/23/2006 issued by National Bank of Romania and National Securities 
Commission on own funds of credit institutions and investment firms requires credit institutions, 
Romanian legal entities, branches of third-country credit institutions operating in Romania, 
financial investment services undertakings, credit co-operatives within credit co-operative networks 
and investment management companies to maintain a level of own funds at least equal to the 
amount of capital requirements for credit risk, dilution risk, position risk, settlement risk,   390
counterparty credit risk, currency risk, commodities risk and operational risk.  
- National Bank of Romania Order No. 12/2007 on the reporting of minimum capital 
requirements for credit institutions transposes into the Romanian legislation the COREP (Common 
solvency ratio reporting framework) reporting forms drawn up by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which stands for the instrument of banking supervision according to 
Basel II principles. The new norms require the observance, both on an individual and on a 
consolidated basis, of requirements for own fund structure and the capital requirements for credit 
risk, market risk, operational risk, dilution risk, position risk, settlement risk, counterparty credit 
risk, commodities risk.  
Banking capital adequacy issue related to risks, raised not only the interest of 
international banking field (directly interested in the stability and the proficiency of banking 
field), but also the interest of scientific communities. Generally, this interest has been materialized 
even in the period preceding the suggestion of modification of Basel Agreement I, in 1999. Thus, 
even in 1980’s, some theoretical approaches presented the methods in which the capital 
requirements must be taken into consideration by the shareholders and by the managers of banking 
societies in what concerns risk management [M. Koehn and A. Santomero, 1980],  [J. Rochet, 
1992], [A.V. Thakor, 1996]. Banking risk management aspects are the object of the study made by 
A. Powell, with applications referring to countries which are implied in a development process [A. 
Powell, 1989]. Following this study, the author, collectively [V. Balzarotti , M. Falkenheim, 2002], 
made it more complete, taking into consideration the risk issue and the capital adequacy related to 
banking field, taking as case study Argentina and its financial crisis.  
The period of the 90’s may be considered the incipient period of empirical studies in the 
field of banking capital adequacy, in different countries. Others authors [K.T. Jacques and P. Nigro, 
1997] examined the impact of capital requirements upon solvency indicatory, based on regressive 
patterns, using information taken from the American banking system and for Switzerland [B. Rime, 
1998].  
After 2000, it must be taken into consideration the emergence in specialized literature and in 
banking field of some complex studies which analyze the new Basel Agreement II and the 
consequences of its application in the case of different national states. An important paper, without 
denying the importance of the Basel Agreement I for the prudential supervision of banking systems 
and for banking capitalization, put the accent on the wide spreading of Basel I in a banking field 
more and more complex [J. Danielsson, P. Enbrechts, Ch. Goodhart, C. Keating, F. Muennich, O. 
Renault, H.S. Shin, 2001]. The authors show that the solvency indicatory provided by Basel cannot 
be scientifically determined and we need to take into considerations the complexity of the 
administration approaches of banking risks and the ways in which we cam measure the capital of a 
banking society.  
In short time after the emergency of the consultative form of the new Basel Agreement II, 
Hellman T.F, Murdock K.C and Stiglitz J.E (in 2000) study the interdependence of moral hazard 
and prudential regulations in banks, asking if it is sufficient the capital of the banks to cope with 
credit risks, market and operational risks. The solutions revolve round the necessity of the 
implementation of banking prudential regulations in capital matter, but with the mention that these 
regulations must be flexible enough to allow the bank to establish their own risk profiles in 
immediate relation with minimal capital [Hellman T.F, Murdock K.C and Stiglitz J.E, 2000)]. After 
its signing in 2005, Basel Agreement II has become a subject matter for those interested in banking 
prudential regulations issue related to capital and risks. M.K. Ong describes the three pillars of the 
new agreement and approaches the methodology of advanced measurements in the administration 
of operational risk. In the same time, he presents a form of the data base of operational loss and of 
insurance of operational risks [M.K. Ong, 2005].  
Specialized studies of the last few years promote more and more elaborated econometrical 
patterns of banking risk administration and banking capital adequacy. Thus, S. Peura and E.   391
Jokivuolle study the banking capital requirements, a study based on stress tests simulations [S. 
Peura and E. Jokivuolle, 2004]. Others authors study the allocation of capital at the level of banking 
societies, a study based on RAROC methodologies (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital) and EVA 
(Economic Value Added) methodology [N. Stoughton and J. Zechner, 2007]. F. Heid analyses the 
cyclic effects of the new agreement of capital and capital volatility [F. Heid, 2007]. C. Homburg 
and P. Schepereel study the allocation of capital based on VAR methodology, analyses and make a 
comparison between some well-known patterns of capital allocation, both theoretical, but also 
practical (cost gap, beta method) [C. Homburg and P. Schepereel, 2008]. T. Eyssel and I. Arshadi 
study capital requirements which are imposed to bank societies taking the form of risk capital [T. 
Eyssel and I. Arshadi, 2008].  
In Romania, the capital requirements of banking societies related to risks and all their 
aspects, in the context of Basel Agreement II, were approached starting from 2000 by the banking 
community and by the officials of National Bank of Romania, preoccupied with the stage of 
preparing the Romanian banking system for the implementation of the new agreement. Also, 
specialized studies were elaborated in this domain by officials of academic field. In the beginning, 
in the period 2000-2005, these studies generally had an informative character related to the 
provisions of Basel Agreement II, because of the insufficient knowledge related to the theme in the 
national economic field and the wide spreading of the new agreement. Informative references to the 
role of the new agreement in the achievement of a high security level and solidity of the Romanian 
banking system belong to some authors [N. Danila, L. Anghel, M.I. Danila, 2002]. Various opinions 
lead to the idea that Romanian banking system was not ready yet for the implementation of the new 
agreement. P. Tulin observed the necessity of preparing of Romanian banking societies for the 
successfully implementation of Basel Agreement II [P. Tulin, 2004]. S. Lazarescu presented in a 
general way the new agreement and he insisted on its relations with European Capital Requirements 
Directives [S. Lazarescu, 2005].  
Subsequently, in the period 2005-2008, in the field related to the theme we treated, in the 
national specialized literature there were conceived complex studies related to the banking risk 
administration field and capital adequacy. It is about certain measurement methodologies of 
banking risk, based on complex econometrical instruments in conformity with Basel Agreement II. 
M. Opritescu individually and collectively, studies in an ample treatise of banking risks 
management, the banking risks, in conformity with Basel Agreement II [M. Opritescu, 2006]. I. 
Trenca presents the methods of measuring the credit risk and the necessity of the development of an 
efficient management, with emphasis on the determination of the capital due to a projected credit 
portofolio [I. Trenca, 2006]. N. Dardac and B. Moinescu conceived a quantitative evaluation of 
credit risk, analyzing the estimation methodologies of unreimbursement probability. Credit risk 
issue is subsequently resumed by the same two authors, in a study concerned with the validation 
techniques of the internal patterns of credit risk [N. Dardac and B. Moinescu, 2006]. Similar to 
foreign studies, the last few years are marked by the emergence in our country of some publications 
which do not limit their selves just to take over and to comment upon Basel Agreement II. It is the 
case of some studies specialized on certain branches of banking risk administration. This fact 
indicates the strong involvement of academic communities and of officials belonging to banking 
fields in achieving advanced information related to the field of banking risk administration and 
capital adequacy.   
 
 
2. Description of the financial framework of capital adequacy in banking societies.  
 
The purpose of the capital adequacy framework Basel II Agreement is to ensure that a 
bank’s capital position is consistent with its overall risk profile and strategy and, as such, will 
encourage early supervisory intervention. Supervisors should have the ability to require banks to   392
hold capital in excess of minimum regulatory capital ratios – a point underscored in the course of 
the Committee’s discussions with supervisors from non-G-10 countries. Furthermore, the new 
framework stresses the importance of bank management developing an internal capital assessment 
process and setting targets for capital that are commensurate with the bank’s particular risk profile 
and control environment.  
The national regulations in the field of banking capital adequacy, according to the Basel II 
Agreement, establish the two kind of capital: 
1. Tier I (Core Capital or Basic Equity) considered the key element of capital on which the 
main emphasis should be placed is equity capital and disclosed reserves. This key element of 
capital: 
- is the only element common to all countries' banking systems;  
- it is wholly visible in the published accounts and is the basis on which most market 
judgments of capital adequacy are made;  
- it has a crucial bearing on profit margins and a bank's ability to compete.  
This emphasis on equity capital and disclosed reserves reflects the importance the national 
supervisor authorities attaches to securing an appropriate quality, and the level, of the total capital 
resources maintained by banks. 
Tier 1 comprises the highest quality capital elements which fully satisfy all of the following 
essential characteristics: 
•  provide a permanent and unrestricted commitment of funds; 
•  be freely available to absorb losses; 
•  not impose any unavoidable servicing charge against earnings; and 
•  rank behind the claims of depositors and other creditors in the event of winding-up. 
In Romanian banking system (pursuant to Regulation No. 18/23/2006 issued by National 
Bank of Romania and National Securities Commission on own funds of credit institutions and 
investment firms), Tier 1 capital consists of:  
a) subscribed and paid-up share capital, except cumulative preferential shares or, as 
appropriate, the core capital made available to the branch in Romania by the third-country credit 
institution;  
b) share premiums, received entirely, related to the equity capital;  
c) legal reserves, statutory reserves and other reserves, as well as the retained earnings, 
following profit distribution;  
d) net profit of the latest financial year, before its distribution in accordance with the 
decisions made at the General Meeting of Shareholders, to the limit of the amount intended to be 
earmarked for each of the destinations (stipulated under let. a) – c)). 
2. Tier 2 (Supplementary capital) includes other elements which, to varying degrees, fall 
short of the quality of Tier 1 capital, but nonetheless contribute to the overall strength of an entity as 
a going concern, and is divided into: Upper Tier 2 capital – comprising elements that are essentially 
permanent in nature, including some forms of hybrid capital instruments which have the 
characteristics of both equity and debt; and Lower Tier 2 capital – comprising instruments which 
are not permanent (i.e. dated or limited life instruments). 
In Romanian banking system (pursuant to Regulation No. 18/23/2006 issued by National 
Bank of Romania and National Securities Commission on own funds of credit institutions and 
investment firms), Tier 2 capital comprises:  
a) base Tier 2 capital;  
b) additional Tier 2 capital.  
Base Tier 2 capital consists of reserves from tangible asset revaluation, adjusted for the 
related fiscal obligations, which are foreseeable upon calculating own funds and other items and 
perpetual securities and other similar instruments that fulfill cumulatively the specific conditions. 
To these may add the cumulative preferential shares (other than those representing items of the   393
additional Tier 2 capital). The additional Tier 2 capital includes temporary cumulative preferential 
shares and the capital in the form of subordinated loans.  
We present a case study of implementing current capital requirements at the level of a 
Romanian banking society. National Bank of Romania sets and monitors capital requirements for 
the banking society as a whole and requires the bank to maintain a prescribed ratio of total capital to 
total risk-weighted assets. We analyze the bank’s regulatory capital into two tiers: 
• Tier 1 capital, which includes ordinary share capital, share premium, translation reserve 
and minority interests after deductions for goodwill and intangible assets and 50% of the interest in 
financial and insurance companies 
• Tier 2 capital, which includes qualifying subordinated liabilities, fixed assets revaluation 
reserves after deduction of 50% of the interest in financial and insurance companies 
The national legislation sets two capital ratio: a risk-based capital ratio (solvency ratio that 
will be >8%) and ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets  
Under the risk-based capital adequacy framework, a Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital adequacy are 
measured by means of a risk-based capital ratio calculated by dividing its capital base by its total 
risk-weighted assets: 
 
          Assets   Weighted -  Risk Total base   Capital    Ratio Capital   based - Risk = = ⋅ ratio Solvency          (1) 
 
Ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets shows Tier 1 capital as a share of total risk-
weighted balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet items, net of provisions. 
 
Table no. 1 
A bank’s regulatory capital position in accordance with the statutory regulations issued by the 
National Bank of Romania at 31 December year N                                                        
- RON 
Indicator  31 December N  31 December N-1 
TIER 1 CAPITAL 
Share capital   611080  393355 
Share premium   98601  94199 
Translation reserves   447902  216601 
Less intangible assets  (7397)  (9056) 
Less 50% of the interest in financial companies  (73483)  (35868) 
TOTAL   1076703  659231 
TIER 2 CAPITAL 
Revaluation reserves  26896  9855 
Subordinated liabilities  243485  236764 
Less 50% of the interest in financial companies  (73483)  (35868) 
TOTAL 196898  210751 
Total regulatory capital   1273601 869982 
Risk weighted assets  10459289  5958940 
CAPITAL RATIOS 
Solvency ratio (total regulatory capital expressed as a 
percentage of total risk-weighted assets) 
12,18% 14,60% 
Ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (total Tier 1 
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Findings. The example has revealed that the bank recorded the lower solvency ratio (12,8 
percent at end- N, down 2,42 percentage points from end- N-1). The main factor behind this 
development is the ongoing expansion of non-government credit, given that bank’s own funds 
posted a slower growth pace. Nevertheless, the solvency ratio has been maintained at an adequate 
level, exceeding the minimum level laid down in prudential regulations applicable in Romania 
(8%). 
At the level of Romanian banking system, according to Financial Stability Report, published 
in 2008 by National Bank of Romania, banks’ solvency indicators continued to decline in 2007, 
against the background of non-government credit expansion, household loans in particular. The 
Romanian banking system remains adequately capitalized, but in 2007, the downtrend followed in 
the past years by the overall solvency ratio of credit institutions was sharper, this indicator dropping 
5.4 percentage points as compared to the end-2006, to 12.7 percent. For the first time in the past 
eight years, three banks reported solvency ratios in a range between 8 percent and 10 percent, whilst 
other three banks recorded solvency ratios ranging from 10 percent to 12 percent. The largest 
concentration is seen in the range of 12 percent and 16 percent, as twelve banks reported solvency 
ratios within this range. At end-2007, only five banks posted solvency ratios higher than 30 percent, 
as compared with eight banks at end-2006. 
We consider that there is a major risk for banks (especially for the banks whose solvency 
ratio is close to the 8 percent minimum level) to have solvency problems. This risk is associated 
with the difficulty to currently assess (at the end of 2008) the impact exerted by the entry into force 
of the new prudential regulations on capital adequacy, which set forth the enforcement of Basel II 
principles since 1 January 2008.   
We believe that the Romanian banking system remains well capitalized, and the solvency 
ratio will raise no problems in the short run, considering the maintenance of a safe margin of the 
aggregate level of this indicator in relation to the minimum level laid down by regulations. But the 
banks’ market share will depend on the increase in own funds (via new equity capital contributions 
from shareholders, subordinate loans, higher reserves, etc). We conclude that an adequate level of 
capitalization indicators of credit institutions secures the maintenance of the overall financial 
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